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Abstract
The economic implications of oil price shocks have been extensively studied since
the 1970s’. Despite this huge literature, no dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model was available that captures two well-known stylized facts: 1) the stagflationary
impact of an oil price shock, together with 2) the influence of the energy productivity
of capital on the depth and length of this impact. We build, estimate and simulate a
New-Keynesian model with capital accumulation, which takes the case of an economy
where oil is imported from abroad, and where these stylized facts can be accounted
for. Moreover, the Bayesian estimation of the model on the US economy (1984-2007)
suggests that the output elasticity of oil might have been above 10%, stressing the
role of oil use in US growth at this time. Finally, our simulations confirm that an
increase in energy efficiency significantly attenuates the effects of an oil shock —a
possible explanation of why the third oil shock (1999-2008) did not have the same
macro-economic impact as the first two ones. JEL Codes : C68, E12, E23, Q43
Keywords: New-Keynesian model, dsge, oil, capital accumulation, stagflation, energy
productivity.
1 Introduction
The two episodes of low growth, high unemployment, low real wages and high inflation
that characterized most industrialized economies in the mid and late 1970s’ are usually
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viewed as the paradigmatic consequences of large price shocks that affect various countries
simultaneously. Despite the huge literature devoted to the implications of oil prices, to the
best of our knowledge, no dynamic general equilibrium model was available that captures
the next two stylized facts : 1) the stagflationary impact of an oil price shock, together with
2) the various impacts of capital accumulation: in addition to the well-known hysteresis
effect [Khr12], the potential role of capital as a new channel for monetary policy through the
non-arbitrage relation involving the rental rate of capital and the Central Bank’s interest
rate and, above all, the role of capital energy efficiency in dampening the impact of an oil
shock.
The present paper introduces energy into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model
in the same way as [BG09] and [BR13], to which it adds capital accumulation. The latter
addition is important not just because it adds realism to the modeling approach, but
also because it improves the reliability of the model’s empirical estimation. Energy is
understood as being just oil, which is imported from abroad at an exogenous world price.
Oil imports are paid for with exports of output, with trade being balanced at every date. Oil
is consumed by households and used as an input in the production of intermediate goods.
As a matter of fact, and this might be viewed as the main contribution of this paper, when
estimated on the US (1984-2007), the output elasticity of oil use turns out to be significantly
larger than what is currently assumed in the macro-economic literature. More specifically,
we find an elasticity between 11% and 12%. In particular, this is much higher than the cost
share of oil, which is usually less than 3%. Our finding confirms the standpoint that has
been defended by several authors, including Ayres, Ku¨mmel, Lindenberger and Voudouris
(see [KL10], [K1¨1] and [AV14]), according to whom the importance of energy in the fabric
of economic growth is amply underestimated in the traditional Solovian approach.
As a result, our specification does react to an oil shock by a short-run decrease in
real GDP and some inflation.1 Next, the introduction of capital accumulation turns out
not to impair the stylized facts just alluded to. Capital even amplifies the response of
the economy to a shock. Our third, and most important, conclusion is that a reduction
of output elasticity of energy suffices to imply a significant reduction of the effect of a
shock on macroeconomic performances. This is the way the reduction of the sensitivity of
industrialized countries to the oil shock in the 2000s’ is accounted for in this paper.
When addressing these issues, we keep an eye on the events of the past decade that
seem to call into question the relevance of oil price changes as a significant source of
economic fluctuations. Since the late 1990s’ indeed, the global economy has experienced
an oil shock of sign and magnitude comparable to those of the 1970s’ but, in contrast with
the latter episodes, GDP growth and inflation have remained relatively stable in much
of the industrialized world until the financial turbulences of 2007-2009 (cf. e.g., Sa´nches
[S0´8], Blanchard and Gal´ı, 2009 [BG09] ; Kilian, 2007 [Kil08]). In Blanchard and Gal´ı
[BG09], a structural VAR analysis suggests that the effects of oil price shocks have recently
weakened because of the decrease in real wage rigidities, a smaller oil share in production
and consumption, and improvements in the credibility of monetary policy. While these
three properties did most probably play a role, this paper explores the explanatory power
of yet another channel —namely the change in energy productivity in the industrial sector
during the 80s’, as a consequence of the first two oil shocks. At first glance, it seems that the
impact of energy productivity is already taken into account through the decline of energy
1For simplicity, we did not add a growth trend to our model. Were we to do so, our results would be a
short-run decrease of the real GDP with respect to the long-run growth trend.
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share in added value, analyzed in [BG09].2 As we argue in the next section, however, these
two parameters —cost share and energy productivity— should be viewed as decoupled
variables, in general. Consequently, if the energy productivity of a country can no more be
captured through its energy cost share, we need an explicit modeling of the efficiency of
capital. This is yet another motivation for having added a capital accumulation dynamics
to the standard DSGE model3. The decoupling of energy productivity from the energy
share cost then opens the door for a reexamination of why the 2000s’ have been so different
from the 70s’. Our finding is that the improvement of energy productivity may well be a
powerful explanatory factor for the muted impact of the oil shock experienced during the
early 2000’s.
Among the 2000s’ oil shock literature, recently, in addition to [BG09], a last contri-
bution is worth noticing, namely Blanchard and Riggi [BR13]. The latter performs an
estimation of a Macroeconomic DSGE model, and confirms that a large decrease of real
wage rigidities and an increase of the credibility of the monetary policy must have con-
tributed to dampening the shock. Together with an estimation based on indirect inference,
Blanchard and Riggi [BR13] calibrate the production function as being constant return to
scale with an output elasticity of oil set equal to 0.015 for the period pre-1984 and 0.012
for the post-1984 period, the output elasticity of labor being therefore 0.985 and 0.988,
respectively.
By contrast, in the present paper, using a Bayesian likelihood approach, most param-
eters are estimated, including oil’s output elasticity. The latter turns out to lie between
0.11 and 0.12. That is, a 10% increase of oil consumption leads to a 1.1% or 1.2% increase
of output —an elasticity 10 times larger than the one supposed by [BR13]. Our finding
also contrasts with the literature where oil output elasticity is usually identified with the
energy cost share, hence close to 0.03. Where does the gap between our output elasticity,
αe, and the cost share come from ? In the present DSGE model, it arises from the GDP
definition and Calvo viscosity of prices (whose value, as usual, is calibrated around 0.65)
which prevents prices from reflecting the standard first order conditions from which the
cost share theorem is derived. At the stationary state, the Calvo friction vanishes, and one
has:
Oil’s cost share :=
PeE
PyY
=
PeE
PqQ− PeE
=
αe
Mp − αe (1)
where Y stands for GDP, Q for domestic output, E for oil andMp for the price markup in
the (imperfectly competitive) production sector. So that, even though they never coincide,
the cost share and output elasticity remain somewhat close to each other. But along the
transitional dynamics towards the steady state, the Calvo friction does enters in the scene.
And this transitional dynamics is crucial for the Bayesian estimation of the output elasticity
2Profit-maximization and perfect competition in frictionless markets imply indeed the equality of energy
output elasticity with the cost share of energy. Since the inverse of output elasticity may be taken as a proxy
for energy productivity, it might seem that the improvement of energy productivity is reflected through the
decline of energy share.
3See, e.g., [Khr12] and the references therein.
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of energy. Together with the fact that, contrary to a large body of the literature, we do not
restrict returns to scale to be a priori constant, this explains why our Bayesian estimation
does not lead to an elasticity close to the empirically observed cost share. Conversely, (1)
implies that, along the steady state, absent any price friction, the cost share should be
close to 10%, which is obviously at odds with historical data. This simply confirms that
the US economy evolved rather far from its steady state during the period under scrutiny.
The elasticity parameter, αe, being constant, its value does not depend upon whether the
economy remained in the vicinity of its steady-state path, or not.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the conceptual framework,
in particular the decoupling issue just alluded to. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4
provides the estimation procedure. Section 5 gives our main findings by analyzing at length
how our model reacts to a real oil price shock. We leave the complete methodological details
and numerical simulations to an extensive on-line Appendix.
2 Conceptual framework
Apart from the introduction of energy as an input in the aggregate production function,
our New-Keynesian framework is rather standard. Three conceptual issues are worth being
addressed: the possible decoupling between the cost share and output elasticity of energy
(subsection 2.1.), the introduction of increasing returns to scale (section 2.2.) and the very
definition of a global “price level” (subsection 2.3.)
2.1 Decoupling the cost share from output elasticity
Direct estimates of the returns to physical capital suggest an output elasticity with respect
to physical capital around 0.7. It seems to contradict the marginal productivity theory of
distribution which asserts that, in competitive markets and under constant returns to scale,
the profit share should be equal to the elasticity of output: the profit share in the developed
countries is indeed well-known to stay around 0.4 since several decades (and tends rather
to decline in the last years). To quote just the seminal papers, Romer (1987) suggested
that the difference is explained by externality in physical capital. Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992, p. 432) argued that this decoupling could be
explained by the omission of variables: investment in education as part of the accumulable
capital in the first paper, human capital in the second. Of course, dropping the assumption
of perfect competition and/or constant returns to scale also helps understand the possible
decoupling.
Following, e.g., [KL10], let us mention yet another reason why output elasticity might
not always equal the profit share, even in competitive markets, under constant returns to
scale and absent any externality of omitted variables. Denoting x = (xi)i the input vector,
Y (·) the production function, and p = (pi)i the real price of inputs, the profit maximization
program of the producer,4
max
x
Y (x)− p · x (2)
leads to:
4In the following argument, the output is taken as nume´raire.
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εi :=
xi
Y (x)
× ∂Y
∂xi
(x) =
pixi
p · x (3)
where εi is the output elasticity of the production factor, xi. This textbook argument
rests on the assumption that the producer’s maximization program (2) faces no constraint
apart from the very definition of Y (·). Suppose, on the contrary, that (2) must be written,
somewhat more realistically:
max
x
Y (x)− p · x s.t. f(x) = 0 (4)
where f(·) is some smooth function. Whenever the input, xi, is interpreted as energy, we
can think of f(·) as capturing geological resource restrictions on fossil energies, geopolitical
or climatic constraints, the bargaining power of labor forces, institutional rigidities of the
labor market, etc. The cost-share identity (3) now involves a shadow price given by the
(normalized) Lagrange multiplier, λ, of the additional constraint, f(x) = 0:
εi =
xi
(
pi − λ∂f(x)∂xi
)
p · x− λxi ∂f(x)∂xi
. (5)
It follows that shadow prices may be responsible for the decoupling between the energy
share, pixi/p · x, and its output elasticity, ε. Suppose, for instance, that the cost share
remains small, while λ → +∞. Then, εi → 1.5 Similarly, ε may take any real value
between xipi/x · p and −∞ whenever 0 < λ < (p · x) ∂xi∂f(x) . So that a large share xipi/x · p
is compatible with a small ε. The strength of this latter argument for decoupling is that
it prevents us from concluding that one factor’s return is underpaid (when the profit share
is below its output elasticity) or overpaid (in the opposite situation): both might well
exhibit a “fair return” once all the constraints in the production sector have been taken
into account.6
In a companion paper, [KG14], the elasticity of primary energy use is estimated through
an error correction model for 33 countries, along time series from 1970 to 2011. Estimated
elasticities are robustly located between 0.4 (France) and 0.7 (U.S.), with an average around
0.6. This empirical finding is confirmed by the Bayesian estimation of the present model,
performed in the same paper —where, again, the output elasticity of energy turns out to
be close to 0.6. According to the previous argument, this seems to suggest that economic
actors face binding constraints regarding the use of primary energy. Similarly, in [KG14],
it is suggested that the output elasticity of capital could be much lower than is suggested
by the capital share. As already noticed, this is perfectly compatible with (5).
Put otherwise, one purpose of this paper is to confirm the relevance of the reduction
of the dependence of the industrialized economies (especially the U.S. economy) to oil in
the 2000s’ as compared to the 1970s’ as an explanatory factor for why the last decade was
so different from the 70s’, and to show that this can be illustrated and modeled without
relying on any a priori coupling between the output elasticity and cost share.7.
5A similar observation is made in [KL08] and [K1¨1].
6One may be tempted to replicate that, at least In the perfectly flexible case, prices should already
reflect the constraint, f(x) = 0, so that there would be no need to make it explicitly in 4. However, for
prices to convey publicly this information, some individual producers must hold it privately, that is, they
must have taken it into account in their individual profit-maximization programme. Consequently, it must
show up as well at the aggregate level.
7Thus, this work complements [BG09] whose analysis is based on this coupling.
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Figure 1: Productivity of oil, world, 1960-2011
Sources: BP statistical review, 2013 [BP13] for oil series and World Bank for World GDP,
2012[Ban12]
As shown by Figure 1, this dependency significantly decreased during the 80s’, most
probably as a consequence of the adaptation of the industrial sector to the shocks received
in the previous decade. The x-axis is the world consumption of oil in millions of tones of
oil-equivalent (toe), the y-axis is the world GDP per capita in 2011 constant US $. The first
point on the south-west stands for 1960, the last one (in the north-east), for 2011. The four
points in the turning phase between the first segment and the second represent the years
1973 to 1979. The closeness of the red points, when compared to the distance separating the
green points illustrates the slow down of growth and oil consumption per capita after the
second oil shock. A complete independence between the world GDP and oil consumption
at the world level would imply that the resulting segments be vertical. Clearly, there was
an improvement in the energy productivity from the 80s’ on as compared to the 60’s and
early 70s’: the slope (2.49) of the affine segment posterior to the second oil shock twice
as large as that of the green segment prior to the first oil shock (1.19). 8 In this paper,
we capture such a shift by decreasing the output elasticity of oil.9 The main question
addressed in this paper is whether such a change in the structure of the production sector
can be responsible for the muted impact of the third oil shock on Western economies.
2.2 Increasing returns ?
On the analytical side, the main consequence of allowing for such non-conventional elas-
ticities is to force us to relax the textbook constant returns assumption which underlies
8Of course, the large R2 (between 0.93 and 0.99) obtained in the two OLS performed before 1973 and
after 1979 suggest a strong endogeneity between GDP growth and oil consumption. This issue is addressed
in [KG14].
9Indeed, whenever ∂Y (x)/x is a decreasing function of x (as in our model), an increase of the productivity,
Q/x, of some input x together with an increase of the demand for x, must translate into a decrease of ε
according to (5).
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(3). There are various motivations for not imposing a priori the constant returns to scale
restriction. Firstly, as is well known, the fact that empirical investigations often conclude
that, at the aggregate level, returns to scale seem constant is but an econometric arti-
fact.10 Second, it is equally well-known that a production sector with strictly decreasing
returns to scale cannot exhibit indefinite growth.11 Hence, endogenous growth must rely,
at some stage or another, on some non-convexity in the production sector. Third, empirical
inquiries unambiguously conclude that, a the micro level, most industrial sectors exhibit
increasing returns to scale.12
Our purpose is not to revisit here the pros and cons of exogenous versus endogenous
growth theory. More simply, we aim at letting the data speak by estimating a New Keyne-
sian model that is compatible with every kinds of returns to scale. Of course, when dealing
with a non-concave production function, the main challenge is to define the producer’s
behavior, as the mere profit maximization program (2) or (4) may no more have any so-
lution (or may admit several solutions). We adopt the most commonly used behavioral
framework found in the literature devoted to increasing returns, namely marginal cost pric-
ing:13 At equilibrium, the representative producer chooses a production plan, x, such that
the price, p, of inputs, equals their marginal cost, ∂Y (x)/∂xi. This seems to be the less
onerous way of dealing with the lack of decreasing returns. Indeed, marginal cost pricing
readily leads to the familiar first-order conditions that are otherwise instrumental for the
numerical simulations of the response to exogenous shocks in the DSGE tradition. In the
context of the DSGE literature, our departure with the standard practice is therefore that
first-order conditions are necessary but need no more be sufficient for profit-maximization.
As a matter of fact, our estimation concludes unambiguously that returns to scale are
strictly increasing. This should not come as a surprise since we did not introduce any ad
hoc technological progress that would fuel exogenous growth.
2.3 GDP deflator and CPI
With no capital accumulation and zero public expenditures, our model reduces to the one
first introduced by [BG09] with two changes, in the monetary policy and in the definition
of the GDP deflator. In Blanchard and Gal´ı [BG09], indeed, the CPI is defined as Pc,t,
the core CPI, as Pq,t and the GDP deflator, as Py,t. The three indices are related by the
following equations:
Pq,t := P
1−αe
y,t P
αe
e,t ; (6)
Pc,t := P
1−x
q,t P
x
e,t; (7)
and
Py,t := P
β
q,tP
1−β
e,t (8)
where Pe,t/Pq,t is the (exogenous) real price of energy at time t, αe, x ∈ (0, 1), but — and
this turns out to be crucial—, β > 1.
10Cf. [Sam79].
11Cf. [HR73].
12 [BL98] and [EG52].
13Cf. [Cor88], [Qui92], [BMC85], [BC90], [DD88a] or [Gir01].
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These conventions have the paradoxical consequence that, when the energy price ex-
periences an upward shock, the GDP deflator decreases (everything else being kept fixed)
as can be seen from (8). We fix this problem by imposing Pc,t ≡ Py,t while keeping (6),
(7), and the following budget identity, which defines GDP, in the left-hand side, as the
aggregation of domestic product minus energy import:
Py,tYt = Pq,tQt − Pe,tEt.
3 A New-Keynesian economy with imported energy
The real prices of oil and capital relative to the price of final good are
Se,t :=
Pe,t
Pq,t
(9)
Sk,t :=
Pk,t
Pq,t
. (10)
They both are assumed to follow AR(1) processes:
ln(Se,t) = (1− ρse)ln(S¯e) + ρse ln(Se,t−1) + ese,t (11)
ln(Sk,t) = (1− ρsk)ln(S¯k) + ρsk ln(Sk,t−1) + esk,t. (12)
where ese,t ∼ N (0, σ2se) and esk,t ∼ N (0, σ2sk), S¯e and S¯k respectively stand for the steady
states of real price of oil and capital.
Let us now briefly describe how capital accumulation and imported oil enter into the
model.
3.1 Household
The representative infinitely-lived household works, invests in government bonds and capi-
tal, pays taxes and consumes both oil and the final good. Its instantaneous utility function
is
u(Ct, Lt) = ln(Ct)− L
1+φ
t
1 + φ
,
where Ct is the consumption at time t, Lt is labor and φ is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity. Let Wt denote the nominal wage, Pk,t, the nominal price of capital, and r
k
t+1,
the real rental rate of capital. The dynamics of capital accumulation follows, as usually,
It := Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate. At variance with several DSGE models, the capital
price is not identified with the consumption price but is rather viewed as exogenous. Indeed,
the custom to identify both consumption and capital prices arises, as is well-known from
the Cambridge controversy, from the lack of an equilibrium condition that would permit
pining down the market value of capital.14 But this mere identification prevents from
14Cf. [Sam66].
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capturing decoupled bubble phenomena, such as the housing bubble that affects most
Western countries since the middle of the 90s’.15
The nominal short-run interest rate, it, is set by the Central Bank. At time t, Tt de-
notes the tax paid by the household. Being the shareholder of the firms, the household
receives the global dividend Dt :=
∫ 1
0 Dt(j)dj, i.e., the sum of dividends of all intermediate
good firms.
The problem of the household is
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(Ct, Lt)
]
, 0 < β < 1, (13)
subject to : Pe,tCe,t + Pq,tCq,t + Pk,t(Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt) +Bt
≤ (1 + it−1)Bt−1 +WtLt +Dt + rkt Pk,tKt + Tt,
where the consumption flow is defined as:
Ct := ΘxC
x
e,tC
1−x
q,t , (14)
with x ∈ (0, 1) being the share of oil in consumption, Θx := x−x(1 − x)−(1−x) and
Cq,t :=
( ∫
[0,1]
Cq,t
−1
 (i)di
) 
−1
a CES index of domestic goods. The transversality con-
dition prevents Ponzi schemes, hence guarantees existence of solutions to the household’s
program:
lim
k→∞
Et
 Bt+kt+k−1∏
s=0
(1 + is−1)
 ≥ 0, ∀t. (15)
The optimal allocation of expenditures among different domestic goods yields:
Pq,tCq,t = (1− x)Pc,tCt (16)
Pe,tCe,t = xPc,tCt (17)
where Pc,t = P
x
e,tP
1−x
q,t is the CPI index. (18)
3.2 Final Good Firm
There is a continuum, [0, 1], of intermediate goods that serve in producing the consumption
commodity. A representative final good producing firm maximizes its profit with no market
power. Its CES production function is given by16
Qt =
( ∫
[0,1]
Qt(i)
−1
 di
) 
−1
, (19)
where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods.
15See, e.g., [BW14].
16For simplicity, no oil is needed to produce the final commodity out of the intermediate goods.
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The final good firm chooses quantities of intermediate goods (Qt(i))i∈[0,1] in order to
maximize its profit:
max
Qt(·)
Pq,tQt −
∫
[0,1]
Pq,t(i)Qt(i)di (20)
subject to : Qt =
( ∫
[0,1]
Qt(i)
−1
 di
) 
−1
(21)
Therefore, the demand of good i is given by Qt(i) =
(Pq,t(i)
Pq,t
)−
Qt. The production
function of the final good firm exhibits constant return to scale, so that, at equilibrium, it
makes zero profit. The price of the final good will therefore be:
Pq,t =
( ∫
[0,1]
Pq,t(i)
1−di
) 1
1−
. (22)
3.3 Intermediate Goods Firms
Each intermediate commodity is produced through a Cobb-Douglas technology involving
oil:
Qt(i) = AtEt(i)
αeLt(i)
α`Kt(i)
αk (23)
αe, α`, αk ≥ 0,
where At is a total productivity factor (TFP) so that its logarithm follows an AR(1)
process, ln(At) = ρaln(At−1) + ea,t, where ea,t ∼ N (0, σ2a).
The strategy of firm i can be decomposed in two steps: First, taking prices Pe,t, Pk,t,
rkt , Wt, and demand Qt(i) as given, firm i chooses quantities of oil Et(i), labor Lt(i), and
capital Kt(i) so as to minimize its cost. Since returns to scale need not be decreasing,
αe + α` + αk will possibly be larger than 1. As a consequence, in this paper, the producer
is assumed to follow the marginal cost pricing behavior, which is characterized by the
(standard) first-order conditions:
marginal cost = mct(i) :=
Wt
α`
Qt(i)
Lt(i)
=
rkt Pk,t
αk
Qt(i)
Kt(i)
=
Pe,t
αe
Qt(i)
Et(i)
. (24)
In order to keep compact notations, we denote Ft :=
( Atααee αα`` ααkk
Pαee,tW
α`
t (r
k
t Pk,t)
αk
) −1
αe+α`+αk , so
that
cost function: cost(Qt(i)) = (αe + α` + αk)FtQt(i)
1
αe+α`+αk , (25)
marginal cost: mct(i) = FtQt(i)
1
αe+α`+αk
−1
. (26)
In the second step, each firm sets the price, Pq,t(i), so as to maximize its net profit.
We assume that prices are set a` la Calvo. A fraction, θ, of intermediate good firms cannot
reset their prices at time t:
Pq,t(i) = Pq,t−1(i).
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and a fraction, 1− θ, sets its prices optimally:
Pq,t(i) = P
o
q,t(i).
Clearly, P oq,t(i) does not depend upon i, and we can write P
o
q,t(i) = P
o
q,t, for every i.
Therefore we have the following “Aggregate Price Relationship”
Pq,t =
(
θP 1−q,t−1 + (1− θ)(P oq,t)1−
) 1
1−
. (27)
At date t, denote Qt,t+k(i) the output at date t + k for firm i that last resets its price in
period t. Firm i’s problem is
max
Pq,t(i)
Et
[ ∞∑
k=0
θkdt,t+k
[
Pq,t(i)Qt,t+k(i)− cost(Qt,t+k(i))
]]
(28)
subject to Qt,t+k(i) =
(Pq,t(i)
Pq,t+k
)−
Qt+k, ∀k ≥ 0.
Again, this problem does not depend on i, hence Pq,t(i) = P
o
q,t. From the first order
condition for P oq,t we have
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkdt,t+kQ
o
t,t+k
[
P oq,t − µpmcot,t+k
]
= 0, (29)
where mcot,t+k := Ft+k(Q
o
t,t+k)
1
αe+α`+αk
−1
, Qot,t+k =
( P oq,t
Pq,t+k
)−
Qt+k for every k ≥ 0 and
Mp := −1 is the price markup.
3.4 Monetary Policy
Let Πq,t :=
Pq,t
Pq,t−1
be the core inflation. As is usual, the Central Bank sets the nominal
short-term interest rate according to the following monetary policy
1 + it =
1
β
(Πq,t)
φpi
(Yt
Y
)φy
εi,t, (30)
where Y represents the steady state of Yt and ln(εi,t) = ρiln(εi,t−1) + ei,t, where ei,t ∼
N (0, σi2).
3.5 Government
The Government budget constraint is:
(1 + it−1)Bt−1 +Gt = Bt + Tt, (31)
where Gt is the nominal government spending. We assume that the real government
spending Gr,t =
Gt
Pq,t
is an exogenous process given by
ln(Gr,t) = (1− ρg) ln(ωQ) + ρg ln(Gr,t−1) + ρagea,t + eg,t
with ω, the share of output that the government takes for its own spending, Q represents
the steady state of the domestic output and eg,t ∼ N (0, σ2g).
At equilibrium, each economic agent solves its maximization problem, all markets clear,
and the government budget constraint is fulfilled.
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3.6 GDP and GDP Deflator
We define real GDP (Yt) as follows:
Py,tYt := Pq,tQt − Pe,tEt
where Py,t is the GDP deflator, that we assume to be equal to the CPI, Pc,t
17.
4 Model Estimation
4.1 Setting
A log-linear version of the model around its steady state is presented in the online Appendix.
Note that for estimation proposes we add an ad-hoc shock for the New-Keynesian Phillips
Curve εp,t
18, that can be interpreted as being a markup shock. Using Bayesian techniques,
we estimate the model19. We choose this estimation technique, because as pointed out by
the literature, the Bayesian approach takes advantage of the general equilibrium approach
and outperforms GMM and ML in small samples.
For the estimation, the data set is made of six macroeconomic quarterly US variables:
real GDP in chained dollars, real private fixed investment, hours worked, inflation, oil use
in production and the Federal Funds rate20. The sample goes from 1984:Q1 to 2007:Q1.
The sample time range is motivated by the well-known structural change in 1984 and the
2007-2008 crisis. Due to the stationary specification of the model, we detrend the first two
series, which are not original stationary, using linear detrending21. The remaining series
are stationary, so we do not detrend them, but we take out their respective mean in the
estimation period.
There are 26 parameters, including parameters that characterize the exogenous shocks.
Of the 26 parameters, we fixe 5 according to the literature. The discount factor β is
calibrated at 0.99. The depreciation rate δ is calibrated at 0.025. We set the government
spending output share ω to 0.18 and we calibrate  to 8, that generate a steady state
markup approximately equal to 1.14. These values are in line with empirical results.
Finally, following Blanchard and Gal´ı [BG09], we calibrate the share of oil consumption for
the households x, at 0.023. The calibration of these parameters are resumed in Table 1.
Those parameters are calibrated due to their well-known lack of identification in macro-
data,
4.2 Identification Analyzis
Before estimating, and due to the fact that there is no consensus about the value of the
oil output elasticity αe, we perform an identification study of the model defined supra,
recently developed by Ratto [Rat08], Ratto and Pagano [RP10], Andrle (2010) [And10],
17See subsection 2.2. for a discussion of this convention.
18Where εp,t is a ARMA(1, 1) process of the form εp,t = ρpεp,t−1 + ep,t− νpep,t−1, where ep,t ∼ N (0, σ2p)
19All estimations are done with Dynare version 4.4.1 [Dyn11]. Two test are available to check the stability
of the sample generating using MCMC algorithm, both implemented in Dynare. The MCMC Diagnostics:
Univariate convergence diagnostic, Brooks and Gelman [BG98] and a comparison between and within
moments of multiple chains.
20For a further explanation about the series sources and transformation, please refer to the online Ap-
pendix.
21We do not use HP-filter techniques because linear detrending implies more persistent deviation from
trend that one-sided HP-filtered data.
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
β δ ω x 
0.99 0.025 0.18 0.023 8
Canova and Sala [CS09] and Iskrev [Isk10] among others, and implemented in the Dynare’s
identification toolbox. This methodology is based on sensitivity analysis of the two first
moments implied by the model together with the data. One can analyze the perturbation
generated by a small change of one or few parameters with respect to the moment.
In order to run an identification analysis, we need to specify starting values for all
parameters to identify. We first initialize our parameters as in Table 2,
Table 2: Starting values for the first identification
αe α` αk φ φpi φy θ ρj σj
0.015 0.7 0.3 1.17 1.2 0.5 0.65 0.5 1
where j ∈ {a, se, sk, g, p, i}, so that ρj denotes all the autoregressive parameters in the
model and σj , all the standard deviations.
The identification results point out that there exist a lack of identifiability strength
for the output elasticity of oil, αe, when its starting value is around 0.015
22. This last
observation gives rise to test whether if this identification strength issue could be fixed
using different initial values for the elasticities. One might propose a set of elasticities
parameters values in order to check local identifiability strength, resume on Table 3.
Table 3: Set of starting values
Elasticity (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
αe 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
αk 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
α` 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
These starting values are built so that αe + α` + αk = 1.1, meaning that we allow for
increasing return to scale technology.
The identification analysis, available on the Appendix, gives us the following results.
Firstly, the highest αe is, the highest identification strength it has. Secondly, one can note
that in this experimentation parameter θ, looses nearly all its identification strength, with
respect to the other variables. This last comment gives rise to estimate and compare the
model with and without estimating θ.
22For a more extensive explanation of this phenomena, please refer you to the appendix.
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4.3 Estimation Results
Most priors are borrowed from Smets and Wouters [SW07] . However, we use an inverse-
gamma distribution for all the elasticity parameters. We use this prior for three reasons:
first to rely on positive values, second to concentrate the probability mass around the first
parameter value and third to allow an asymmetry in the estimation.
Here we present a resume table for all estimations and the results obtained with the
conditions that give us the best log-marginal density in both cases: (a) θ estimated and
(b) θ calibrated. However, the complete results for all the different 14 estimations are
available on the Appendix. The estimation of both cases is motivated by three facts. First,
as explain in the last section, the parameter θ looses identification strength as soon as
we change starting values for elasticity parameters. Second, the New-Keynesian Philips
Curve equation, mixes parameters θ, αe, αl and αk, therefore in the estimation process, the
inference of the Calvo parameter can interfere the inference on the elasticities parameters.
Third, when estimating θ the posterior mean obtained suggests that θˆ ∈ [0.9320; 0.9751]
(except for one inference, which gives us θˆ = 0.5250). Regarding to the literature on price
stickiness, this interval indicates a much more higher degree of stickiness that the one
usually found in the literature. For the case where θ is calibrated, one can set this value
at 0.65, consistent with previous findings in the literature.
Table 4 reports the prior and the posterior distributions for each parameter along with
the mode, the mean and the 10 and 90 percentiles of the posterior distribution for both
cases. In the same way, Table 5 refers to the estimates of the prior and posterior distribu-
tions of the shock processes. Finally, Table 6 presents a summarize of all estimations. It
is structured as follows. The first column presents the oil’s output elasticity first param-
eter of the inverse-gamma distribution used as a prior. The second column displays the
log-marginal density of each estimation. The third column shows the posterior of the oil’s
output elasticity. Finally, the fourth column summarizes the sum of output elasticities.
The priors distribution and priors’ parameters of other variables remain unchanged except
for the prior’s parameters of αk and α` that change along with αe, as shown in Table 3.
Table 6 is ranking (ascending) with respect to the log-marginal density values. Several
observations can emerge from this table. First, the first (best) three estimations when θ is
estimated give us the sum of elasticities greater than the steady state markup (ε/(ε− 1) ≈
1.14). This gives rise to problematic economic interpretation due to the fact that one can
show that if
∑
i∈{e,l,k} αi > ε/(ε − 1), the steady state value of firm’s profit is negative.
This is not surprising, since the model does not restrict the production function to have a
constant return to scale technology together with the fact that the estimation procedure
can hit the upper bound of the prior distribution. So in this case, one might find results
without economic sense. This observation gives rise to an augmented estimation procedure
in order to avoid this situation, especially, one can propose a narrower restriction on the
upper bound of prior distribution on output elasticities, define shortly. Second, the first
estimate of oil’s output elasticity when θ is calibrated, suggests an estimated αˆe similar to
its first prior value. According to the first identification analysis around αe = 0.015, the
identification strength of this parameter, advocates a weak identification. This intuition
is confirmed using Figure 2, the prior and the posterior distribution match, therefore the
identification issue previously raised is confirmed since this parameter is only explained by
its prior distribution.
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Table 4: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Structural Parameters
Parameter
Prior
distribution
Posterior distribution
Mode Mean 10% 90%
θ estimated
Capital elasticity αk IGamma(0.1,2) 0.3728 0.3599 0.3380 0.3822
Labor elasticity α` IGamma(0.4,2) 0.6424 0.6411 0.6111 0.6745
Oil elasticity αe IGamma(0.6,2) 0.1234 0.1254 0.1051 0.1460
Inverse Frisch elasticity φ IGamma(1.17,0.5) 0.6209 0.6308 0.4736 0.8019
Taylor rule response to inflation φpi Normal(1.2,0.1) 1.2235 1.2253 1.0686 1.3558
Taylor rule response to output φy Normal(0.5,0.1) 0.8020 0.7882 0.6884 0.8876
Calvo price parameter θ Beta(0.5,0.1) 0.9812 0.9812 0.9380 0.9883
θ calibrated
Capital elasticity αk IGamma(0.2,2) 0.3918 0.3809 0.3624 0.3989
Labor elasticity α` IGamma(0.4,2) 0.5947 0.5966 0.5622 0.6305
Oil elasticity αe IGamma(0.5,2) 0.1132 0.1177 0.0915 0.1434
Inverse Frisch elasticity φ IGamma(1.17,0.5) 1.2562 1.2625 0.9073 1.6069
Taylor rule response to inflation φpi Normal(1.2,0.1) 1.5236 1.5307 1.3883 1.6722
Taylor rule response to output φy Normal(0.5,0.1) 0.0265 0.0214 0.0001 0.0402
Figure 2: Posterior (solid black kine) and prior (solid grey line) distribution of αe. The
dashed green line stands for the posterior empirical mode
4.3.1 Restricted Estimation
Table 7 refers to the upper bound restriction limits for the first three estimations of Table 6
with respect to their own stars superscripts.
As shown in Table 8, once we restrict the model, the log-marginal density drops to
a lower level. We can conclude that the model where θ is estimated and where the first
prior parameter of αe is equal to 0.6, corresponding to the forth column of the Table 6,
outperforms these latest.
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Table 5: Prior and Posterior Distribution of Shock Parameters
Parameter
Prior
distribution
Posterior distribution
Mode Mean 10% 90%
θ estimated
Autoregressive parameters
Technology ρa Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.8619 0.8481 0.7960 0.8999
Real oil price ρse Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.5761 0.5611 0.4629 0.6669
Real capital price ρsk Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.7210 0.7080 0.6647 0.7524
Price markup1 ρp Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.9418 0.9283 0.8955 0.9640
Price markup2 νp Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.9796 0.9760 0.9610 0.9913
Government ρg Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.9058 0.8995 0.8712 0.9258
Tech. in Gov. ρag Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.6904 0.6127 0.3549 0.9472
Monetary ρi Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.9399 0.9308 0.9035 0.9581
Standard deviations
Technology σa IGamma(1,2) 0.4361 0.4435 0.3901 0.4942
Real oil price σse IGamma(1,2) 2.0000 1.9373 1.8652 2.000
Real capital price σsk IGamma(1,2) 0.7740 0.7675 0.6379 0.8781
Price markup σp IGamma(1,2) 0.1814 0.1854 0.1615 0.2094
Government σg IGamma(1,2) 2.0000 1.7921 1.5508 1.9998
Monetary σi IGamma(1,2) 0.5410 0.4566 0.3859 0.5205
θ calibrated
Autoregressive parameters
Technology ρa Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.9605 0.9401 0.9033 0.9774
Real oil price ρse Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.9934 0.9872 0.9754 0.9977
Real capital price ρsk Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.8940 0.8924 0.8483 0.9314
Price markup1 ρp Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.9839 0.9621 0.9299 0.9971
Price markup2 νp Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.1652 0.1711 0.0593 0.2758
Government ρg Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.9373 0.9312 0.9061 0.9560
Tech. in Gov. ρag Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.7129 0.6589 0.3808 0.9541
Monetary ρi Beta(0.5,0.2) 0.1914 0.2104 0.1249 0.2856
Standard deviations
Technology σa IGamma(1,2) 0.4538 0.4542 0.3981 0.5078
Real oil price σse IGamma(1,2) 2.0000 1.9475 1.8842 2.000
Real capital price σsk IGamma(1,2) 0.5459 0.5750 0.4722 0.6714
Price markup σp IGamma(1,2) 0.4235 0.4645 0.2868 0.6602
Government σg IGamma(1,2) 2.0000 1.8359 1.6425 2.000
Monetary σi IGamma(1,2) 0.4778 0.4769 0.4062 0.54555
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Table 6: Summary of estimation results
αe prior value Log marg. density αˆe Sum of αi
θ estim. θ calib. θ estim. θ calib. θ estim. θ calib. θ estim. θ calib.
0.015* 0.015 -567.16 -570.93 0.1178 0.0117 1.3648 1.1077
0.3** 0.5 -567.65 -589.99 0.085 0.1177 1.3622 1.0952
0.5*** 0.2 -579.18 -591.80 0.1138 0.0533 1.2002 1.0913
0.6 0.1 -586.98 -592.99 0.1254 0.0356 1.1264 1.1188
0.1 0.6 -592.84 -593.28 0.082 0.1304 1.1168 1.0966
0.4 0.3 -596.08 -596.51 0.1090 0.0625 1.0226 1.1023
0.2 0.4 -596.92 -600.66 0.0839 0.1055 1.1322 1.0915
Table 7: Prior’s upper bound restriction on output elasticities parameters
Elasticity 0.015* 0.3** 0.5***
αe 0.4 0.4 0.3
αk 0.3 0.35 0.3
α` 0.7 0.75 0.7
Table 8: Restricted estimation results
αe prior value Log marg. density αˆe Sum of αi
0.015* -591.24 0.0798 1.0666
0.3** -594.37 0.0727 1.0681
0.5*** -620.28 0.1458 1.1341
4.4 Estimation Analysis
Concerning behavioral parameters, summarized in Table 4, several key informations are
worth making. Firstly, we find evidence for increasing return to scale technology i.e. capi-
tal’s output elasticity is on average 0.37, labor’s output elasticity is 0.62 and oil’s output
elasticity is 0.12. Leading to an average sum of 1.1. Likewise, these findings break the
oil’s output elasticity of 0.015 adopted by Blanchard and Gal´ı [BG09]. Furthermore, the
key feature of our findings is that oil’s output elasticity at 0.12 is robust regarding both
estimates. Secondly, both monetary policy response coefficients (φpi and φy) are signif-
icantly different. On the one hand, when θ is estimated, we find a lower core inflation
coefficient (φpi) than Taylor [Tay93] originally stated, whereas the response to output gap
(φy) is higher. These results are in line with findings in Rudebusch [Rud06]. On the
other hand, for the case where θ is calibrated, we find a response to core inflation close
to Taylor [Tay93] estimation, nevertheless the response coefficient to output gap is nearly
non-significant. One can analyze this difference due to the inference of θ ≈ 0.96 in the
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first case, meaning a high rigidity on core CPI price re-setting. Hence core inflation have
low probability to reach a high level compares to the calibrated case (θ = 0.65). Since
inflation is highly controlled by the Calvo parameter in the first case, the Central Bank
has no reason to overreact to inflation, in contrast to its counterpart. Thirdly, findings
on the inverse of Frisch elasticity are truly different. This is not surprising, since there is
no consensus in the literature, see Browning, Hansen and Heckman [BH99] among others.
The first estimate leads to a Frisch elasticity equal to 1.585 (≈ 1/0.6308) and the second
estimate is 0.79 (≈ 1/1.2625). It is worth emphasizing that Smets and Wouters [SW07]
finding of this parameter is 0.52 (≈ 1/1.92), close to what we find for the case where θ is
calibrated to the Smets and Wouters [SW07] Calvo parameter posterior mean, i.e. 0.65.
Turning to the estimates of the stochastic processes, Table 5, one can extract important
observations. Concerning standard deviation estimates, most of the variance is driven by
the demand shock (σg) and real price of oil (σse) in both estimates
23. The high standard
deviation for the price of oil can be interpreted as being the resulting of a financial asset
trade in a volatile stock market. For the case θ calibrated, we find a high persistency on
AR(1) coefficients for government spending (0.93), price markup (0.96), technology (0.94)
and the real price of oil (0.98), whereas for the other case, only the first two, together with
the monetary policy (0.9308) have a high autoregressive parameter. The stylized fact from
the previous observation is the strong difference between monetary policy autoregressive
parameters over our estimates, indeed, on the one hand we have a high persistency whereas
on the other hand we have a value close to the one find by Smets and Wouters [SW07].
This can be explain by the fact that when θ has a high level, hence the core CPI is low,
then monetary authorities will set its interest rate by a persistent impulse, i.e. a shock
with a high memory.
5 Simulations and Results
5.1 The effets of an oil shock
There are six sources of potential exogenous shocks in our economy: the real price of oil, the
real price of capital, the government expenditure, the monetary policy, the price markup
and the technology. Having estimated the model, we study the impulse response functions
(thereafter IRFs), using the mean of the posterior estimation. We will concentrate on the
real price of oil shock.
We make the analysis for both estimation protocols, namely the situation where θ is
estimated along with the other parameters, and its counterpart where θ is calibrated.
Let us begin with the case where θ is estimated. The estimated value of θ being 0.96,
this implies a high stickiness level in prices. The corresponding IRFs are represented in
Figure 3. As expected, an increase of the price of oil generates a immediate decrease of
oil consumption but a limited reaction on domestic prices (which are too viscous to react
instantaneously). Consequently, intermediate firms do not reduce their production, but
prefer substitute capital and labor to oil. Real wages, therefore, increase as well as the
rental rate of capital. Because domestic consumption is in any case affected and the rental
rate of capital is high, the representative household prefers to invest more than to consume.
However, despite the increase on domestic production, GDP is affected negatively because
23Note that standard deviations describe in Table 5 are in percentage, meaning that if σ = 1, then 1
stands for 1%
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Figure 3: Response to one standard deviation shock on real price of oil. Case: θ estimated
of the growing cost of importing oil. Finally, the small inflationary pressure induces a weak
monetary reaction of the Central Bank.
Let us now study the case where θ is calibrated at 0.65. Figure 4 presents the corre-
sponding IRFs. Now, a larger fraction of firms can reset optimally their prices instanta-
neously, so that the inflationary effect of an oil shock is more pronounced. Therefore, the
shock provokes a large decrease in consumption. The latter hits the domestic producers,
who therefore reduce their production. Due to the lower demand, no substitution effect
takes place, so that firms decrease their demand for capital, labor and oil. This reduced
inputs’ demand depressed both real wages and the rental rate of capital. Consequently
investment decreases. The reduction of production lowers also the marginal cost of inputs,
which provokes a deflation. In an attempt to re-launch the economy, the Central Bank
then decreases its interest rate. GDP is also more negatively affected in this case than in
the previous simulations, due to the reduction of domestic output. Moreover, the negative
impact of the oil shock is much more persistent in the calibrated case. This comes from the
fact that the posterior value of the autoregressive shock drops from 0.9872 to 0.56. Note
also that when θ is calibrated, the posterior value of the Taylor rule response to output
parameter, φy, drops from 0.78 to 0.02, meaning that the Central Bank practically does
not react to the GDP reduction.
The overall conclusion is that, contrary to what intuition would perhaps suggest, a
higher price flexibility does not imply that the economy is more immune to an oil shock.
5.2 Reducing the oil dependency ?
Let us now analyse the reaction to an oil shock of an economy that has decreased its
dependence with respect to oil. To capture this feature, we reduce the oil’s output elasticity
from 0.11 (or 0.12) to 0.05. Figure 5 and Figure 6 present the IRFs for a 1% increase in the
real price of oil in the θ-calibrated case and the θ-estimated situation. In both cases, the
impact of an oil shock is significantly reduced by the smaller dependency of the economy
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Figure 4: Response to one standard deviation shock on real price of oil. Case: θ calibrated
with respect to oil: domestic inflation, reduction of real wages and of GDP are attenuated
by the reduction of αe. This is quite logical and should not come as a surprise. How
intuitive this finding might be, it sheds some important light on two issues: Firstly, this
provides a good explanatory candidate for the muted impact of the third oil shock which
lasted from 2000 to 2007. Our empirical estimation of αe is based on the whole period 1984-
2007, and arises therefore as a time average. This does not preclude the true elasticity of oil
from having decreased across time during this very period, as it is convincingly suggested
by Figure 3 above. Therefore, one reason why we did not observe the stagflationary effect
we could have expected for during the early 2000s’ may have been the successful reduction
of the US economy’s dependency towards oil consumption. The second insight is forward-
looking. As we have seen, more flexibility does not mean a better immunization against
an oil shock, at least if flexibility refers to domestic price flexibility. Reducing the output
elasticity of oil, by means of increasing the oil efficiency of production, turns out to be a
much more promising policy recommendation.
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Figure 5: The ecological transition effect. Case: θ calibrated
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Figure 6: The ecological transition effect. Case: θ estimated
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